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Gambling on Hunger?  
Commodity Derivatives Trading and the Right to Adequate Food  
 
Anna E. Chadwick* 
 
 
NGOs have claimed that financial speculators, gambling on food prices via 
commodity derivative instruments, contributed to the global food crisis in 2007-11. 
Commodity futures contracts began life as a form of agricultural insurance and were 
predominantly used to stabilize commodity prices. How did it come about that these 
instruments were turned against agricultural production, leading to violations of the 
human right to adequate food? This article draws on the history of commodity 
futures trading to explore the claims of NGOs regarding the causal significance of 
speculation in the recent crisis. It finds that the financialization of futures markets in 
recent decades has created new channels of influence whereby activity in commodity 
derivatives markets can impact on underlying food prices. The implications for 
efforts to realize the human right to adequate food are elaborated.  
KEYWORDS: world hunger, commodity derivatives, financialization, the right to 
adequate food 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Extreme levels of commodity price volatility in 2007-11 led to a global food crisis. While 
the price of many commodities was affected, the most prodigious inflation occurred in markets 
for grain. Between 2007 and 2008 the price of maize, rice, and wheat on international markets 
more than doubled, in some cases in a matter of months.1 Approximately half of the calories 
consumed by the world’s poor are accounted for by these three staple grains.2 What is more, food 
price inflation was typically far greater in poorer countries in the Global South than in many 
richer ones in Europe, or in the US.3 According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture 
                                                          
* Lord Kelvin Adam Smith Research Fellow, University of Glasgow (anna.chadwick@glasgow.ac.uk). 
1 Mitchell, A Note on Rising Food Prices, World Bank, Working Paper No: WPS4682 (2008) available at 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/229961468140943023/A-note-on-rising-food-prices, at 3. 
2 Lobell et al, ‘Prioritizing climate change adaption needs for food security in 2030’ (2008) 319 Science 5863 at 608. 
3 Ivanic and Martin, Implications of higher global food prices for poverty in low-income countries, World Bank, 
Working Paper: WPS 4594 (2008) available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/253001468150585777/Implications-of-higher-global-food-prices-for-
poverty-in-low-income-countries.  
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Organisation (FAO), the number of chronically hungry people in the world rose by 75 million in 
2007 alone.4 Food prices plummeted rapidly again in 2009, however, the rapid price deflation 
caused another kind of havoc for the millions of small farmers and agricultural laborers 
worldwide who depend on agricultural revenue for their livelihoods.5 This pattern of extreme 
price inflation and equally precipitous deflation was played out again on international markets 
less than a year later. Grain prices moved in a strikingly similar trajectory between the second 
half of 2010 and late 2011.6 While high food prices present an obvious challenge for poor people 
attempting to command access to food, high levels of price volatility—volatility understood as 
the variation in the price of a commodity over a period of time—are harmful over the longer 
term. Commodity price volatility damages prospects for investment and economic growth, leads 
to harmful exchange rate volatility—thereby prejudicing the ability of populations to attain stable 
supplies of food imports—and disrupts domestic agricultural production strategies. 7 Although 
the general consensus is that the global food crisis is now over, in many countries food prices 
have remained elevated beyond pre-crisis levels.8 Patterns of high and rapidly fluctuating food 
prices are predicted to intensify in the decades to come, as a growing global population is forced 
to cope with the threats posed to agricultural production by climate change.9 This does not bode 
well, given that the recent crisis has already intensified the vulnerabilities of poor and 
marginalized communities. A 2016 report by the Institute of Development Studies and Oxfam 
concludes that the global food crisis has had a lasting impact on patterns of labour and 
consumption in the Global South, forcing many people to work longer hours and to travel greater 
distances to find work and to buy food.10  
 
The question of what was responsible for these extraordinary market movements has divided 
economists since the first price spike emerged. On the supply side, it has been suggested that a 
combination of unfavourable weather conditions, low stock levels, and the ill-timed imposition 
of export-bans meant that markets were ‘tight’ in the months leading up to the food crisis.11 A 
‘tight’ market is one in which demand for a given commodity outstrips the available supply, 
                                                          
4 FAO, ‘The State of Food Insecurity in the World: High food prices and food security – threats and opportunities’ 
(2008) available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/011/i0291e/i0291e00.htm, at 6.  
5 Von Braun, Food and Financial Crises: Implications for Agriculture and the Poor, International Food Policy 
Research Institute (2008) available at: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/47663/2/pr20.pdf, at 7.  
6 ‘World food prices reach new historic peak’ FAO Media Centre, 3 February 2011, available at: 
www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/50519/icode/. 
7 Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, ‘Volatility and the natural resource curse’ (2009) Oxford Economic Papers Gpp027. 
8 Scott-Villier et al, Precarious Lives: Food, Work and Care After the Global Food Crisis, Joint report: Institute of 
Development Studies and Oxfam (2016) available at: https://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/precarious-
lives-work-food-and-care-after-the-global-food-crisis-620020, at 8.  
9 Wenzlau, ‘Global Food Prices Continue to Rise,’ 13 April 2013, available at: www.worldwatch.org/global-food-
prices-continue-rise-0. 
10 Supra Scott-Villier n 8, at 50-54. 
11 For an overview of the significance of these factors see Heady and Fan, ‘Anatomy of a crisis: the causes and 
consequences of surging food prices’ (2008) 39 Agricultural Economics 1: 375-391. 
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leading to an increase in prices. Others have argued that the increased production of biofuels, a 
growing appetite for meat in emerging economies, and the depreciation of the US dollar 
conspired to increase demand for the grains in question.12 Almost all of these factors are likely to 
have made some contribution to the price spikes. However, what has also become apparent is 
that none of them, either alone or in combination, can account for the full measure of price 
volatility. As analysts at the FAO have emphasised, in April 2008, corn volatility was 30 per cent, 
and soybean volatility 40 per cent beyond what could be accounted for by relevant supply and 
demand fundamentals during that period.13 As this divergence has come under further scrutiny, 
numerous analysts have suggested that a surge in speculative activity in commodity derivative 
markets in the years leading up to the crisis could be responsible for exacerbating price volatility. 
The significance of this claim requires emphasis. As I discuss below, many scholars have argued 
that the structure of the global food system is responsible for exacerbating the poverty and the 
precariousness suffered by the food insecure. However, the claim that financial speculators were 
able to distort commodity prices beyond the fundamentals of supply and demand by investing in 
derivatives implicates modern market structures in the production of hunger in a manner 
previously thought to be impossible. The global market in food commodities is constructed 
around a single scheme for the measurement of the value of food—its price. If this central 
ordering mechanism can be distorted by financial speculation carried out via instruments linked 
to this measure of value, what does this imply for international ambitions to tackle food 
insecurity and realize the right to adequate food?  
 
Part Two of the article contextualizes the debate on the role of commodity derivatives 
speculation in the global food crisis by placing it against the broader background of world 
hunger. Part Three elaborates on the phenomenon of commodity derivatives trading and relates 
the competing claims made by NGOs, economists and the financial services industry regarding 
its possible causal significance in the crisis. Part Four then turns to the history of commodity 
futures trading to explore the changing composition of these markets, and the dramatic shift in 
the role that they play in the global economy. Finding evidence that would corroborate the claims 
of NGOs—that commodity futures markets have been ‘financialized’ since the late 1980s — the 
section concludes that this paradigm shift has created new avenues whereby investment in 
commodity derivatives can impact on underlying food prices. Part Five concludes with an 
analysis of some of the implications of these findings for efforts to realize the human right to 
adequate food.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
13 FAO, Volatility in Agricultural Commodities: An Update (2008) available at: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ai466e/ai466e13.htm. 
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2. WORLD HUNGER AND THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS 
 
There was much that was extraordinary about the 2007-11 global food crisis—the 
magnitude of the price inflation, the number of countries affected, and the role of new industries, 
such as biofuel production, in its causation. As the former Special Rapporteur on the right to 
food, Olivier de Schutter, has observed, the crisis was also unique in that it was ‘possibly the first 
price crisis that occurred in an economic environment characterized by massive amounts of 
novel forms of speculation in commodity derivative markets.’14 For the millions of people who 
were suffering from hunger in the decades preceding the crisis, however, their experience of the 
events of 2007-11 may have been nothing out of the ordinary. Food crises of a regional and 
seasonal variety—a number of them resulting in famines—had been endured by millions of 
people around the world prior to these recent events.15 Philip McMichael, a food-regime theorist, 
has argued that food crises are ‘endemic to the modern world’, pointing to the prior global food 
crisis of 1972-74.16 Others contend that decades of artificially low prices, procured through the 
use of agricultural subsidies in the Global North, have resulted in recurrent crisis for millions of 
peasant farmers in the South who, unable to compete, are driven off their land.17  
 
To emphasise the prevalence of hunger in the decades leading up to the global food crisis is 
not to imply that no progress has been made towards its eradication. Understanding of the causes 
of hunger has advanced considerably in recent years. Dominant approaches prior to the 1980s, 
which focused predominantly on the provision of food aid and the transfer of technologies to 
boost supplies, have been gradually replaced by a new generation of targeted interventions 
geared to the achievement of ‘food security’.18 The origins of this concept lie in the theories of 
the development economist, Amartya Sen, who revolutionized thinking on the causes of famine 
with his analytic of ‘entitlements’.19 Contemporary approaches to tackling food insecurity reflect 
the insight that, more often than not, hunger is suffered not because of a lack of available food, 
but because of the inability of people to command access to food economically.20 While natural 
disasters and conflict continue to be regarded as two important proximate causes of hunger, 
                                                          
14 De Schutter, Food Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crises: Regulation to reduce the risks of price 
volatility, (2010) Briefing Note 02, available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/Briefing_Note_02_September_2010_EN.pdf, at 3. 
15 For a discussion of some these crises see generally Dreze, Sen, and Hussain. The political economy of hunger: 
selected essays (1995).  
16 McMichael, 'The World Food Crisis in Historical Perspective' (2009) 61 Monthly Review 3. 
17 Rosset, 'Food Sovereignty and the Contemporary Food Crisis' (2008) 51 Development 4 at 460. 
18 Food security is commonly defined as including both physical and economic access to food that meets people's 
dietary needs as well as their food preferences.  FAO, Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security, WSFS 
2009/2, (2009) available at: http://www.fao.org/wsfs/wsfs-list-documents/en/ 
19 Entitlements can be defined as the socially determined rights and opportunities which enable people to legally 
command access to food. Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (1981). 
20 WFP, ‘Causes of hunger’, available at: www.wfp.org/hunger/causes. 
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poverty is now recognized to be the preeminent factor conditioning hunger globally.21 Another 
key development in the fight to end world hunger has been the elaboration of a human right to 
adequate food. The codification of the right in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966 was the first step in advancing efforts to combat hunger 
beyond it being a moral duty or a policy choice, instead making it a legally binding human rights 
obligation. Subsequently, the contents of the right were made more concrete, notably in General 
Comment 12 of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), which puts the onus on national governments to create the conditions for the 
progressive realization of the right.22 In 2004, the FAO developed a further set of Voluntary 
Guidelines to provide practical guidance to States in their implementation of the right, and a 
number of new initiatives have been launched in the post-crisis context.23 A UN High-Level 
Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis (HLTF) was established in April 2008 the 
mandate of which is to ‘scale up’ investment in food and nutrition security with a specific focus 
on working towards the realization of the right to food.24 
 
That these moves represent a sincere effort by the international community to respond to the 
problem of world hunger is not in doubt. Nevertheless, in spite of advancements made in the 
establishment of institutions that promote food security and the right to adequate food on a 
formal level, overwhelmingly, these entitlements are not sufficiently realized in practice. Hunger 
persists, in spite of the increasingly sophisticated strategies developed by governments and 
international agencies seeking to tackle it. Advancing an explanation for this state of affairs, a 
growing body of critical scholarship has suggested that the stubborn persistence of hunger may 
be a consequence of structural problems and inequities in the global food system. 25  Their 
interventions may be informed by different methodologies and may concentrate on different 
substantive issues, however, critics of development policy,26 food regime theorists,27 advocates 
of ‘food sovereignty’,28 and critical scholars of international economic law29 have all intervened 
                                                          
21 Ibid.  
22 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No 12: The Right to Adequate 
Food (art. 11), 12 May 1999.  
23 FAO, Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of 
national food security, (2005). 
24 HLTF, Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action, (2010) available at: 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ISFP/UCFA_Final.pdf, at xi. 
25 See Jacqueline Mowbray for a discussion of some of the limitations of rights-based approaches to tackling 
hunger. Mowbray, ‘The Right to Food and the International Economic System: An Assessment of the Rights-Based 
Approach to the Problem of World Hunger’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 3. 
26 Frank, The development of underdevelopment (1966); Rist, The history of development: from western origins to 
global faith (2002); Peet, Unholy Trinity: the IMF, World Bank and WTO (2003). 
27 Proponents of ‘food regime theory’ carry out historical materialist analysis of the development of the global food 
system. See Friedmann and McMichael, ‘Agriculture and the state system: The rise and decline of national 
agricultures, 1870 to the present,’ (1989) 29 Sociologia ruralis 93; Friedmann, ‘Distance and durability: Shaky 
foundations of the world food economy’ (1992) 13 Third World Quarterly 371. 
28 Patel, ‘Food sovereignty’ (2009) 36 The Journal of Peasant Studies 663; Shattuck and Holt-Giménez, ‘Moving 
from Food Crisis to Food Sovereignty’ (2010) 13 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 2; Trauger, 
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to a similar effect: ever since the period of European colonialism, they maintain, populations in 
the Global South have been subjected to successive waves of agricultural and development-
oriented ‘restructuring’ that have served to intensify conditions of food insecurity for many 
vulnerable populations.  
Here I summarize the arguments of these scholars. It is commonly asserted that the 
widespread adoption of an industrialized, specialized, export-oriented mode of agricultural 
production has increased the reliance of Southern populations on grains traditionally consumed 
by people in the North, such as maize, rice, and wheat. This homogenization of diets has meant 
that poor people in low income countries face competition not only from wealthier consumers 
purchasing food grains, but also in the form of biofuels and feed grains for livestock. 30 
Industrialized agricultural production—which requires substantial capital to instigate and 
depends on fossil fuels and other expensive inputs to function—has also been shown to favour 
wealthy commercially experienced actors over small farmers with few resources. This has 
resulted in the displacement of rural populations throughout the Global South who have been 
driven into urban slums, or onto marginalized land that is less fertile and appropriate for the 
growing of food.31 As a consequence of the promotion of this model of agricultural development, 
many developing countries are now highly dependent on imports for their food supplies. 
Mozambique, for instance, imports 60 per cent of the wheat its people need, and Egypt imports 
50 per cent of its food supplies.32 Making matters worse, what critics denote ‘the industrial agri-
foods complex’ now occupies the centre of the global food system. Two companies, Archer 
Daniels Midland (ADM) and Cargill capture three-quarters of the world grain trade.33 Enabled 
by the same international rules on trade and investment that have created obstacles for countries 
in the South in their attempts to access Northern markets,34 these companies take advantage of 
what are designated ‘global value chains’—referring to the disintegration and re-integration of 
production through inter-firm, inter-country trade in order to take advantage of the lowest 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
‘Toward a political geography of food sovereignty: Transforming territory, exchange and power in the liberal 
sovereign state’ (2014) 41 Journal of Peasant Studies 1131. 
29 Carmen Gonzales illuminates the role of the international trade regime in creating and exacerbating vulnerability 
and food insecurity in the South.  Gonzalez, ‘Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Food 
Security, and Developing Countries’ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 440; Gonzalez, ‘Trade 
liberalization, food security and the environment: the neoliberal threat to sustainable rural development’ (2004) 
14 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 419; Orford, ‘Food security, free trade, and the battle for the 
state’ (2015) 11 Journal of International Law and International Relations 1. 
30 Magdoff and Tokar, ‘Agriculture and Food in Crisis: An Overview’ available at: 
www.monthlyreview.org/2009/07/01/an-overview-of-the-food-and-agriculture-crisis/ [last accessed 20 January 
2017]. 
31 Bello and Baviera, ‘Food Wars’ in Magdoff and Tokar (eds), Agriculture and food in crisis: Conflict, resistance, and 
renewal (2010) at 43-6. 
32 De Schutter, Observations on the current food price situation: Background Note, 21 January 2011 at 1. 
33 Wiggins and Levy, Rising Food Prices: A Global Crisis, Overseas Development Institute Report (2010) available at: 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/1630.pdf.  
34 Gonzales, supra n 29. 
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possible price for a given input.35 Small farmers cannot compete and are priced out of the market, 
leading to yet more rural poverty and resulting in the further monopolization of global markets 
by transnational companies.36  
The movement for ‘food sovereignty’—connoting people's democratic control of the food 
system—asserts that nothing less than the fundamental restructuring of the global food system 
will address the persistence of hunger. 37  Originating with the peasant organisation, La Via 
Campesina, proponents advocate restructuring control over land and food in order to respond to 
widespread inequities in market power.38A key goal of the food sovereignty movement is to ‘re-
localize’ the production and consumption of food, de-linking, as far as possible, local producers 
from global markets. While few economists or policymakers anticipated the global food crisis, 
advocates of food sovereignty have been warning of the threat to food security posed by the 
current structure of global food system for years. The particular form of the recent crisis, 
however, demands that greater attention be paid to what has remained a relatively under-
researched feature of the global food system: the role of financial markets. In the search for an 
explanation for the extraordinary volatility of 2007-11, NGOs such as Oxfam and Global Justice 
Now (GJN) (formerly the World Development Movement),39 economists including Jayati Ghosh 
and Cornelia Staritz,40 and a number of financial services industry insiders have argued that a 
recent surge in speculative activity in global commodity derivative markets could have been 
responsible for conditioning the price spikes.41 They have set out to prove that, while millions of 
                                                          
35 Gibbon, Bair, and Ponte, ‘Governing global value chains: an introduction’ (2008) 37 Economy and Society 3. 
36 Vargas and Chantry, Ploughing through the meanders in food speculation, GRAIN, (2011) available at: 
http://www.odg.cat/en/publication/ploughing-through-meanders-food-speculation, at 19. 
37 Patel, ‘What Does Food Sovereignty Look Like?’ (2009) 36 The Journal of Peasant Studies 3. 
38 ‘What is La Via Campesina?’ available at: www.viacampesina.org/en/index.php (follow ‘Organisation’ hyperlink).  
39 Jones, The Great Hunger Lottery: How banking speculation causes food crises, World Development Movement 
(2010) available at: 
https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/resources/hunger_lottery_report_6.10.pdf; Worthy, 
Broken Markets: How financial market regulation can help prevent another global food crisis, World Development 
Movement (2011) available at: https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/resources/broken-
markets.pdf; Herman, Kelly, and Nash, Not a Game: Speculation vs. Food Security, Oxfam Issues Briefing (2011) 
available at: http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/not-a-game-speculation-vs-food-security-regulating-
financial-markets-to-grow-a-143669; Vander Stichele et al, Financing Food: Financialisation and Financial Actors in 
Agriculture Commodity Markets, SOMO Report, (2010) available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228290851_Financing_Food_Financialisation_and_Financial_Actors_in
_Agriculture_Commodity_Markets. 
40 Ghosh, Heintz and Pollin, ‘Speculation on commodities futures markets and destabilization of global food prices: 
exploring the connections’ (2012) 42 International Journal of Health Services 465; Staritz and Küblböck, Re-
regulation of commodity derivative markets – Critical assessment of current reform proposals in the EU and the US, 
ÖFSE – Austrian Research Foundation for International Development, (2013) available at: 
http://www.oefse.at/fileadmin/content/Downloads/Publikationen/Workingpaper/WP45_re-regulation.pdf.  
41 Soros, interviewed for Stern magazine, 3 July 2008, available at: 
www.stern.de/wirtschaft/news/maerkte/george-soros-we-are-in-the-midst-of-the-worst-financial-crisis-in-30-
years-625954.html. 
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people in the Global South went hungry during the global food crisis, financial instruments were 
being used by financial speculators in wealthy parts of the world to ‘make a killing on hunger’.42  
 
The next section explores the phenomenon of commodity derivatives trading and relates the 
competing claims made concerning its role in the grain price volatility of 2007-11. 
 
 
3. COMMODITY DERIVATIVES TRADING AND COMMODITY 
PRICE VOLATILITY 
 
Commodity derivative contracts form part of a broader class of financial instruments 
known collectively as ‘derivatives’, thus called as they are said to derive their value from that of 
an underlying asset. Some of these assets are tangible, like agricultural commodities, fuels, and 
property; others are intangible, such as currencies, interest rates, and stocks. Derivatives take the 
form of contracts that enable contracting parties to assume a trading position on the anticipated 
movements of the underlying asset in the future.43 Depending on the contractual nature of the 
derivative, parties will be afforded a particular set of rights and obligations as concerns the asset. 
Derivatives are commonly used for what are known as ‘speculating’ and ‘hedging’ purposes. 
Parties using derivatives to speculate are seeking to profit from price changes in the underlying 
asset. By contrast, those using derivatives for hedging purposes are seeking to anticipate risks 
that could impact their interests in the physical assets underpinning a particular derivatives 
contract,  such as a shipment of grain, or they might enter into a derivatives transaction to 
diversify their portfolio of investments—a strategy that can be understood as a form of macro-
hedging.44  
 
Derivatives have a reputation for being highly complex—a perception supported by the 
complex financial formulas used to calculate their value. From a legal perspective, however, 
derivatives have their origins in a more basic instrument known as a ‘futures contract’. A futures 
contract is a standardized contract through which two parties agree to exchange a fixed amount 
of a given commodity at an agreed date in the future for a sum of money negotiated in the 
present. For example,  Farmer A contracts with Manufacturer B on the first of September 2017 to 
deliver one tonne of wheat on the first of December 2017, for a price of five thousand euros. 
Depending on what the market value of one tonne of wheat is on the first of December 2017, one 
party will have benefitted from the transaction, and the other will have made a loss. However, 
both parties will have insulated their livelihoods against the possibility of an even greater loss. 
                                                          
42 Grain, Making a Killing on Hunger, (2008) available at: https://www.grain.org/article/entries/178-making-a-
killing-from-hunger. 
43 Hudson, The Law of Finance (2009), at 1093. 
44 For a more detailed discussion of the nature and function of derivatives see Folger, ‘What is a derivative?’ 
Investopedia, available at: http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/12/derivative.asp. 
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Farmer A does not risk the market being flooded with wheat, which would mean he would 
receive low compensation for his harvest, and Manufacturer B does not risk being forced to pay 
a very high price for wheat in the event of a market scarcity.  
 
Futures contracts have been used for centuries as a mechanism of agricultural insurance. 
Originally, these instruments were only sold via institutions known as ‘futures exchanges’. 
However, in recent decades a new market known as the ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) market—also 
known as the ‘swaps’ market—has emerged.45 Prior to the new regulations introduced for this 
market after the global financial crisis (discussed below), OTC transactions were carried out 
bilaterally, between private parties, and were transacted outside of formal futures exchanges. 
OTC derivatives were—and continue to be— principally traded by large banks and hedge funds; 
these institutions also created a more sophisticated range of financial instruments linked to 
commodity prices, most notably, commodity ‘index funds’. Index funds are an investment 
vehicle designed to give investors a return based on a mathematical formula aggregated from the 
values assigned to a specified basket of commodities, including non-food commodities such as 
fuels and metals.46 The first such index was created by Goldman Sachs in 1991.47 These products 
enable a wide range of actors to gain profitable exposure to commodity futures markets without 
having to engage directly in ‘costly and fiddly direct trading’ in the futures market.48 According 
to data provided by GJN, there has been an enormous growth in index fund holdings in 
agricultural commodity markets, which have increased 26-fold from around three billion US 
dollars in 2003 to 80 billion in 2011, with index funds making up over 60 per cent of overall 
financial holdings in agricultural futures markets. 49  Pension funds—retirement schemes that 
require employers to contributions to match those made by employees to go towards the 
provision of a pension—have been funnelling large volumes of capital into commodity index 
funds over the last decade. GJN estimated in 2014 that £1.5 billion of UK pension savings were 
being used to speculate on food prices—£180 for every person in the UK contributing to a 
pension.50 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 Swaps are a species of derivative that enable parties to ‘swap’ their respective advantages in different markets 
for mutual benefit. However, ‘swaps’ is a common name given to all OTC derivatives. ‘IBM in Deal on Currency’ 
New York Times, 18 August 1981. 
46 See further ‘Commodity Index’, Investopedia, available at: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commodityindices.asp. 
47 ‘Standard & Poor’s to Acquire Goldman Sachs’ GSCI,’ 6 February 2007, available at: 
www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/press/press-releases/archived/2007/2007-02-06.html. 
48 World Development Movement, ‘Dangerous Futures: How are pensions fuel hunger’ (2013) available at: 
https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/resources/pension_report_final.pdf, at 9. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid at 4. 
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A. Competing Causal Claims 
 
NGOs argue that deregulation of commodity futures markets since the late 1990s has invited 
an influx of speculators into the market, usurping the traditional role of futures contracts in 
agricultural risk management. Many such ‘speculators’ are financial actors employed at banks 
and hedge funds, whose daily business is the retailing and trading of financial instruments. They 
may be financial traders trading commodity derivatives on a short-term basis, or they may be 
financial investors or pension funds managing a portfolio of investments that includes 
commodity derivatives over a longer time horizon. While the particular strategies used by these 
actors may differ, they are united in their intention to make a profit through market speculation: 
by predicting how the market values assigned to existing ‘assets’—in this instance, underlying 
commodities—are going to change over time. This influx of speculators is said to have brought 
about the ‘financialization’ of commodity futures markets, helping to produce a ‘speculative 
bubble’ in commodity prices much in the way that speculative bubbles are seen to emerge in 
markets for financial assets. In broad terms, financialization in this context can be understood as 
the increased role of financial motives, financial actors and financial institutions in the operations 
of commodity futures markets.52 Of critical importance is the effect that this is seen to have on 
behaviour within the futures market and the market for OTC derivatives, as well as on the prices 
of food commodities. The principal concern is that the stabilizing effect that futures can have on 
commodity prices has been subordinated to the potentially destabilizing pursuit of financial 
profit. Analysts at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have 
argued that as a result of the dominance of financial investors in contemporary commodity 
futures markets, prices in futures markets no longer accurately reflect supply and demand 
fundamentals for the commodities in question.53 As I will discuss below, this presents a serious 
threat to the stability of the prices of physical food commodities.  
NGOs and campaigners have presented facts and figures documenting the huge upswing in 
investment in commodity derivatives to corroborate their claims about the role of speculation in 
the causation of the crisis. Their reports detail how the notional amount of outstanding 
commodity derivatives contracts was valued at $1,270 billion in June 2004 and had risen to 
$6,394 billion by June 2006; 54   how the volume of investment in commodity index funds 
increased by 1,900% between 2003 and March 2008;55  and how, by 2012, financial actors 
outnumbered commercial participants in commodity futures markets by as many as four to one.56 
                                                          
52 Epstein (Ed), Financialization and the world economy (2005) at 3. 
53 UNCTAD, Don’t blame the physical markets: Financialization is the root cause of oil and commodity price 
volatility, (2012) available at: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/presspb2012d1_en.pdf at 1-2. 
54 Bank of International Settlements, Quarterly Review, (December 2006). 
55 Wahl, Food Speculation as the Main Factor of the Price Bubble in 2008, World Economy, Ecology & Development, 
(2009) available at: http://www2.weed-online.org/uploads/weed_food_speculation.pdf at 11.  
56 Michael Greenberger speaking at the High Level Thematic Debate on Addressing Excessive Price Volatility in 
Food and Related Financial and Commercial Markets, United Nations, New York, on Wednesday 11 April 2012, 
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Campaigners have also sought out expert testimony from industry insiders. As GJN reports, 
‘Gregory Fleming, President of Merril Lynch, said in May 2008 that commodity markets looked 
similar to the dot.com bubble of the late 1990s and the bubble in structured-credit products 
which preceded the credit crunch.’57 Sympathetic economists have compiled statistical evidence 
that would appear to demonstrate a causal relationship between speculative activity and price 
volatility, demonstrating how the surge in demand for commodity derivatives maps onto the 
trajectory of grain prices during this period.58 UNCTAD has further presented evidence that 
commodity index funds—the primary vehicle for financial investment in food commodity 
markets—have altered market pricing dynamics.59 New correlations between previously distinct 
groups of commodities have been observed since index fund trading has become widespread.60 
For example, while ten years ago the price of stocks traded on the Euro Stoxx 600, the price for 
crude oil and the price for agricultural commodities behaved differently. Since the introduction 
of commodity index funds, these prices have begun to move almost in unison. 61 NGOs and 
campaigners have condemned the activities of financial speculators, and have called on 
policymakers and regulators to take action. As GJN asserted in 2010, ‘allowing gambling on 
hunger in financial markets is dangerous, immoral and indefensible. And it needs to be stopped 
before any more people suffer to satisfy the greed of the banks.’62  
 
On an intuitive level, it seems highly plausible that a phenomenal surge of any kind of 
investment into a market could have an impact on the prices within it. Attributing the price 
volatility in 2007-11 to a class of greedy, risk-loving speculators has also proven popular—
speculators have been prosecuted in the media for ‘profiting from hunger’63 and ‘gambling on 
starvation’.64 However, claims that speculation in commodity derivatives could have the kind of 
impact suggested in the NGO literature are strongly denied by many within the financial services 
industry.65 Paul Krugman, a Nobel prize winning economist, has insisted that no matter how 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
available at: www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/04/general-assembly-thematic-debate-on-addressing-
excessive-price-volatility-in-food-and-related-financial-and-commodity-markets.html [last accessed 18 November 
2016]. 
57 Jones, supra n 39 at 10. 
58 Ghosh, ‘The unnatural coupling: Food and global finance’ (2010) 10 Journal of Agrarian Change 72.  
59 Jones, supra n 39 at 9. 
60 Correlation is a statistical measure that indicates the extent to which two or more variables fluctuate together. A 
positive correlation indicates the extent to which those variables increase or decrease in parallel; a negative 
correlation indicates the extent to which one variable increases as the other decreases. ‘Correlation’ available at: 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/correlation. 
61 UNCTAD, supra n 53 at 3. 
62 Jones, supra n 39 at 4. 
63 Hari, ‘How Goldman gambled on starvation’ The Independent, 2 July 2010. 
64 Kaufman, ‘Want to stop banks gambling on food prices? Try closing the casino’ The Guardian, 10 May 2012. 
65 Deutsche Bank has recently supported its decision to continue investing in commodity derivatives arguing that 
‘there is no convincing evidence that the products we offer have a de-stabilizing impact on prices and cause more 
people to go hungry.’ Deutsche Bank, ‘Our position: the key questions and answers’, available at: 
www.db.com/cr/en/concrete-current-questions-and-answers-may-2014.htm. 
12 
 
much financial investment flows into commodity futures markets, ‘a futures contract is a bet 
about the future price. It has no, zero, nada direct effect on the spot price of a physical food 
commodity’.66 Indeed, the argument that financial actors taking positions in derivatives markets 
could have such an impact on underlying food prices contravenes many of the mainstays of 
economic theory. Prices in a market economy are supposed to bear a rational relationship to their 
‘true’ values as determined by fundamentals of supply and demand. This is thought to be 
particularly the case with asset prices in financial markets, which are commonly believed to aid 
the process of price ‘discovery’, acting as sophisticated mechanisms of assimilation and 
dissemination on supply and demand fundamentals across dispersed markets. 67 Even if a group 
of speculators was driving futures prices away from fundamentals, it is commonly held that ‘the 
market’—in actuality, a group of other market actors known as ‘arbitrageurs’—would correct 
this.68 Many economists also resist what they regard as an unfair and ill-informed portrayal of 
speculative investment. As Bharat Kulkarni argues, ‘[b]y assuming risk, providing liquidity and 
capital the speculator brings stability to the market’.69  
As I will argue later, there is good reason to question whether the assumptions underlying 
economic theories of price formation are safe when the huge shift in the character and operations 
of traditional futures markets—and the operations of commodity derivative markets—are taken 
into account. At the present juncture, though, it is also necessary to emphasise that there are 
ambiguities in NGO accounts of these events. NGOs have tended to single out ‘speculative’ 
‘financial’ investment as a negative practice, and to look approvingly on the use of futures for 
‘commercial’ ‘hedging’ purposes. However, distinguishing whether an investment practice is or 
isn’t ‘speculative’ is not an easy task.70  Speculative investment is often equated with short-term 
trading, and is reputed to involve taking on higher levels of risk than the average investor. Yet, 
commodity index investment, identified as a key culprit in contributing to the commodity price 
volatility, is carried out over the long-term, and provides stable, as opposed to risky, returns.71 
Complicating matters further, many financial institutions use commodity futures to ‘hedge’ 
against risks taken in other financial markets. Banks and hedge funds retailing commodity index 
funds actually take up the less-profitable, more risky side of the trade to facilitate the investments 
of their clients. This requires them to use commodity futures contracts to hedge against the 
potential liabilities that they may incur. 72 Such macro-portfolio hedging strategies make it more 
difficult to distinguish which traders, or institutions, are acting as financial ‘speculators’, or when 
                                                          
66 Krugman, ‘Speculative nonsense once again’ The New York Times, 23 June 2008. 
67 The theory that financial markets are ‘informationally efficient’ is known as the ‘efficient markets hypothesis’. 
Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A review of theory and empirical work’ (1970 25 The Journal of Finance 383.  
68 Krugman, ‘Commodity prices (wonkish)’ The New York Times, 19 March 2008.  
69 Kulkarni, Commodity Markets & Derivatives (2011) at 40. 
70 For a discussion of the semantic and conceptual issues that stem from the identification of a given practice as 
‘speculative’ see Szado, ‘Defining speculation: The first step towards a rational dialogue’ (2011) 14 The Journal of 
Alternative Investments 75. 
71 Clapp, Food (2012) at 142. 
72 ‘Macro-hedge’, Investopedia, available at: www.investopedia.com/terms/m/macrohedge.asp. 
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they are doing it. Furthermore, large corporate traders of physical food commodities—Bunge, 
Cargill and Louis Dreyfus—not only sell commodity derivative products to farmers and food 
processing companies, they also take speculative positions in the market with their own capital.73 
Some of these agricultural conglomerates own hedge funds that specialize in trading commodity 
derivatives such as Black River Asset Management LLC, a subsidiary of Cargill, which was 
estimated to have $6 billion in assets in October 2011.74 
 
B. Evidence of a Connection 
Parties on both sides of the debate over commodity derivatives speculation have carried out 
causal economic analysis to try to establish whether or not speculative activity was the cause of 
price volatility. 75  Many studies rely on Granger causality testing, but reach disparate 
conclusions.76 A joint report on food price volatility written for the G20 by a number of agencies, 
including the FAO, International Monetary Fund (IMF), UNCTAD and the World Bank, 
illustrates the difficulty in forming a conclusive recommendation on this issue. The report 
concludes that increased financial sector involvement in food commodity markets ‘probably 
acted to amplify short-term price swings and could have contributed to the formation of price 
bubbles in certain circumstances’.77 Under pressure to respond to what civil society actors have 
insisted is a grave threat to food prices, policymakers have adopted a precautionary approach. 
They have moved to introduce regulations to reduce ‘excessive’ levels of speculation in 
commodity derivative markets.78 Governments in the US and Europe have now finalized rules 
which aim to subject the OTC derivative market to a higher degree of regulatory supervision and 
oversight.79 Provisions in Title VII of the US Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
                                                          
73 Murphy, Burch, and Clapp, Cereal Secrets: The world's largest grain traders and global agriculture, Oxfam (2012) 
available at: https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-cereal-secrets-grain-traders-agriculture-
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74 SOMO, Challenges for Regulators Financial Players in the (Food) Commodity Derivatives Markets (2012) available 
at: https://www.somo.nl/challenges-for-regulators-2/ at 5. 
75 The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) provides a helpful compendium of much of this work, see 
Lilliston and Ranallo (eds), Excessive Speculation in Agriculture Commodities: Selected Writings from 2008-2011, 
IATP, (2011) available at: http://www20.iadb.org/intal/catalogo/PE/2011/08247.pdf.  
76 The Granger Causality test is a test developed by Nobel prize-winning econometrician, Clive Granger. It is 
acclaimed for providing a rigorous way of establishing when correlations might have a causal link. Granger, 
‘Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-spectral methods’ (1969) 37 Econometrica 424. 
77 FAO, IFAD, WFP et al, Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses (2011) available at: 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/est/Volatility/Interagency_Report_to_the_G20_on_Food_Price_Volatilit
y.pdf.  
78 ‘G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit,’ 24-25 September 2009, available at 
www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html. 
79 The US rules fall under the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 Pub.L. 111–203, 
H.R. 4173 (Title VI and Title VII). The European provisions are contained in two separate pieces of legislation: 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, 
central counter-parties (CCPs) and trade repositories (TRs) (EMIR), and Directive 2014/65/EU of the European 
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Protection Act 2010 (Dodd Frank), 80 and European equivalents under the second Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II),81 and the European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR),82 require that derivative trades are better collateralised, that transaction data is reported 
to regulatory agencies, and that transactions are ‘cleared’ through a regulated body known as a 
‘clearinghouse’.83 ‘Position limits’, which place an upper limit on the number of contracts other 
than bona fide hedging positions which an investor, a or combined group of investors, may hold 
for a specific commodity, have also been put in place.84 These limits are expressly designed to 
restrict the volume of both exchange traded futures contracts and commodity derivative contracts 
that financial investors are able to control, thereby limiting their capacity to distort the prices of 
underlying commodities. 
 
NGOs have largely welcomed the reforms. Nevertheless, critics have suggested that the new 
measures are unlikely to protect commodity prices from future interference. It has been argued 
that the position limits put into place by regulators are set too high, and that a total ban on 
various forms of commodity derivatives trading should have been pursued.85 Others have noted 
that,  in spite of protracted attempts to develop a clear formula for distinguishing between which 
trades are ‘speculative’ and which are ‘bona fide commercial hedges’, this distinction is not 
adequate to capture the complex realities of contemporary trading practice. 87  Adding to 
regulator’s woes, the position limits set by the CFTC were struck down by a court in Washington 
after two trade associations associated with the derivatives industry moved against them.88 The 
text of the US Dodd Frank Act only mandates the imposition of such limits ‘as appropriate’.89 
Significantly, these groups contended that this was not the case since, in their view, it ‘remains 
unclear’ that excessive levels of speculation were the cause of recent price volatility.90 The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 
2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU Text with EEA relevance (MiFID II). 
80 Pub.L. 111–203, H.R. 4173. 
81 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU Text with EEA relevance. 
82 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 OJ (2012) L201/1. 
83 Instead of transacting with another financial or commercial party, the clearing requirement mandates that a 
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clearinghouses, and for developing appropriate tools and procedures for risk mitigation. 
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hedgers using commodity derivatives to insure themselves against risks arising in the course of their businesses. 
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(2012) available at: 
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88 International Swaps and Derivatives Association Inc. and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association v. 
United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, District Court For The District Of Columbia (Civil Action No. 
11-CV-2146 (RLW)). 
89 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Sec. 737, ‘Position Limits’ (2)(A) Establishment of 
Limitations.  
90 For a discussion of the implications of this judgement, see Williams, ‘Dodging Dodd‐Frank: Excessive Speculation, 
Commodities Markets, and the Burden of Proof’ (2015) 37 Law & Policy 119. 
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CFTC appealed the judgement, and is currently in the process of drafting new rules to impose the 
limits.91  Nevertheless, unresolved doubts about the nature and extent of the role played by 
speculation in the causation of the recent price volatility could serve to undermine the effective 
operation of the regulations. 
 
I have analyzed the relevant provisions of the new US and European regulations in another 
contribution, where I argue that the new measures are unlikely to be effective as they do not 
adequately account for how the financialization of futures markets has altered processes of price 
formation for physical food commodities in the first instance. 92  I consider that the new 
regulations are unlikely to be of much value in terms of protecting the human right to adequate 
food, and, to the extent that these reforms create the impression that something is being done to 
tackle the phenomenon of food commodity speculation, I think that they may serve to exacerbate 
the problem. As Susan Marks has cautioned, reforms can be problematic when they allow 
‘admonition, indignation and condemnation to get in the way of explanation.’93 It may not be 
possible to discover the ‘truth’ about the role of speculation in the global food crisis, particularly 
using the causal models typically used by economists. By turning to history, however, it may be 
possible to advance beyond the unhappy status quo, which is characterized by the vilification of 
financial speculators by NGOs and the media on the one hand, and the equally insistent denials 
of the financial services industry on the other.  
 
In the paragraphs to come, I will seek to shed more light on the nature of the relationships 
between global finance, commodity derivatives, and food price volatility. Practices of 
speculation in commodity markets have a long lineage, and have been linked to episodes of grain 
price volatility in the past. Equally important, though, is the fact that the global trade in 
commodity derivatives today bears little resemblance to the primarily national, exchange-based 
futures speculation of earlier eras. Rather than fixating on the speculative practices of financial 
traders—as do the new US and European regulations— what emerges from the history below is 
that it may be the broader financialization of commodity futures markets, and the liberalization 
of the global economy, that can help to explain these recent market events. Importantly, this 
history will illustrate the mistake of those who tend to portray OTC derivative markets as 
somehow operating beyond the reach of the State—as markets that are only now, post-2008, to 
be subject to regulation.94 As will be demonstrated, law and State institutions have played a 
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much more active role in enabling the prices of food commodities to become subject to the 
ministrations of global financial markets than is commonly acknowledged. 
 
 
4. THE FINANCIALIZATION OF FUTURES TRADING 
 
Many of the NGO reports on food commodity speculation make some reference to the 
history of commodity futures trading to ground their claims. What is more,  a number of scholars 
have charted the evolution of the futures contract from a form of agricultural insurance to its 
present-day incarnation as a new variety of financial asset.95 Much of the existing literature on 
the history of futures trading focuses on the US and the significant developments that took place 
there in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This history will evince the same geographical 
bias, and it will cover something of the same substantive territory, however, it will also be a 
retelling that underlines key issues that other histories have neglected.  
A. Commodification 
The first organized futures exchange operated many centuries ago, in Osaka, Japan. 96 
However, the contemporary practice of futures trading owes much to developments in the US. 
The original futures contract—then termed a ‘forward’—was widely used there in the nineteenth 
century as a mechanism of agricultural insurance.97 Such contracts were typically negotiated 
between a farmer and a grain merchant, and operated so as to ‘lock in’ a price for the crop in 
question, preventing a change in market conditions from impacting too drastically on their profits. 
Using a forward contract to mitigate the risk involved in a business in this way became known as 
‘hedging’. While forward contracts did reduce some of the hazards involved in agricultural 
production, the bilateral nature of the arrangements meant that one party could always go 
bankrupt and end up forfeiting on their commitments. Moreover, as the US economy expanded, 
the need arose for a centralized marketplace for the trading of commodities and the transferring 
of risk. For these reasons, agricultural entrepreneurs in the city of Chicago, the preeminent city 
for commodities trading at the time, founded the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1848.98 The 
CBOT took control of the mountains of grain arriving in Chicago from the increasingly 
productive farms of the American mid-West. It created better storage facilities, and, by the 1850s, 
had established a system of staple grades, standards and inspections, all of which rendered the 
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grain that was stored its inventories fungible. This meant that purchasers of grain no longer 
contracted for a specific crop of wheat or corn with a particular farmer, but began to contract for  
a set quantity of the grains stored in the warehouses of the CBOT.99 These interventions were 
envisaged to facilitate a productive and profitable trade in agriculture. The same is true of the 
move away from the trading of ‘inefficient’ individualized forwards contracts towards the use of 
standardized ‘futures’—a step taken in 1865. The new standardized contracts were identical in 
terms of the quantity, quality, delivery month and terms of the trades being made.100 Unlike 
forwards, however, these instruments were exchangeable. This early act of commodification was 
critical to the rise of speculative trading in futures. Only now could parties with no connection to 
agricultural production profit by trading the contracts as a commodity, without having to be 
concerned about the practical complications of storing tonnes of maize or wheat.  
B. Privatization 
By the late 1880s, the competences of the CBOT expanded, and it began acting as an 
intermediary, guaranteeing both sides of the futures contracts.101 In order to do business in this 
way, those involved had to be members of the CBOT, demonstrate financial solvency, deposit 
‘margin’ payments to collateralize the trades, and abide by specified rules relating to contract 
settlement, payments and deliveries, and grievance procedures.102 As a result, farmers and grain 
merchants could rely on a more efficient means of hedging risk. The improved efficiency of the 
futures exchanges also eliminated another kind of risk, however, which was the legal risk that 
had previously left speculators vulnerable to having their contracts voided under the Common 
Law. 103  During the eighteenth century, Common Law courts in both the US and the UK 
elaborated the ‘rule against difference contracts’ to deter parties from speculating on price 
movements. Futures contracts that were carried out for the sole purpose of profiting from price 
changes were deemed to be no different from gambling. Whether the parties to a futures contract 
‘intended’ or could have ‘reasonably intended’ to take physical delivery of the commodities 
contracted for was the test used by judges to differentiate legitimate hedging from speculative 
contracts for difference.104 However, even if neither party to a difference contract expected to 
take delivery, courts would nonetheless enforce the contract if one party had some pre-existing 
economic interest in the underlying good that would be damaged by the occurrence of the same 
event that would allow it to profit under the contract.105 This was to preserve the benefits of 
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futures trading for commercial actors who, albeit not contracting to buy or sell the commodity 
itself, nonetheless wished to use them to hedge against risk.  
Lynn Stout has offered a compelling counter-narrative that qualifies the tendency to portray 
the early CBOT as an area dedicated to servicing agricultural production. By guaranteeing the 
performance of futures contracts, even if they were transacted for speculative motives, and by 
ensuring that members posted collateral and had adequate finances, the commodity exchanges 
functioned precisely as a mode of ‘private ordering’ that allowed speculators into the market.106 
Public courts would not enforce speculative futures contracts for the agriculturally unaffiliated 
due to concerns about a variety of economic and social ills, but the private exchanges would. 
Significantly, though, neither the US government or the US courts made speculative trading 
illegal.107 Thus, in effect, the State legitimized arenas of exception in which the speculative 
trading of futures contracts was able to flourish, so long as it was carried out by those with the 
resources to participate in an exchange. 
C. Publicization 
The commodification of forwards contracts and the private ordering of the CBOT did 
contribute to a rise in speculative trading in commodity futures during the late-nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless, the exchanges were still largely the province of farmers, millers, merchants, and 
other parties whose business was concerned with agricultural production. 108  Indeed, the 
successes of organized futures trading led to futures exchanges based on the Chicago model 
being established in Liverpool, Frankfurt, New York, and Vienna, and later in India and 
Argentina. 109  Back in the US, however, there was trouble on the home front. Government 
subsidies and mechanized production methods had led to the chronic overproduction of many 
staple crops. After World War One, agricultural commodity prices in the US collapsed.110 Wages 
were falling, and consumption levels no longer accommodated supply. Vast quantities of grain 
were left rotting in the warehouses of Chicago. This led to an epidemic of price manipulation as 
farmers, manufacturers and grain handlers began to hoard physical commodities and to trade in 
futures contracts in an attempt to drive prices back up.111 Widespread manipulation began to 
attract the attention of legislators, who moved to introduce new regulations to prevent price 
fixing. However, while these concerns were exertive, it was the development of ‘shadow’ futures 
exchanges known as ‘bucket-shops’ that led to a legislative clamp-down on speculation in the 
1930s.  
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In 1877, the CBOT began publishing futures prices on a regular basis.112 Bucket-shops made 
use of this information, and, assisted by the development of the ‘stock ticker’—a device used by 
stockbrokers that printed price information on stocks and futures transmitted over telegraph 
lines—began to rival the fee-paying, members-only exchanges.113 Bucket-shops functioned as a 
kind of ‘off-track’ betting parlour where ordinary citizens too poor to participate in the 
exchanges could place wagers on the prices listed on organized exchanges.114  The spate of 
speculation that ensued led to widespread condemnation of bucket-shops as gambling dens. 
Stories began appearing in newspapers about ‘reckless men who had squandered tens of 
thousands of dollars, bankrupted themselves, ruined their reputations and destroyed their 
families’.115 Many states in the US moved to declare bucket-shop wagers legally void, in some 
instances making running a bucket-shop criminal.116 During this period, however, the organized 
futures exchanges also began to face criticism. Farmers and small business owners increasingly 
complained that speculative traders were using futures to manipulate the markets, leading to 
commodity price volatility.117 A legal battle between the bucket-shops and exchanges was waged 
between the 1880s and 1903, with the exchanges seeking to prevent bucket-shops from using 
their futures price quotations to facilitate wagers.118  Courts consistently rejected the attempt of 
the CBOT to claim a proprietary interest in their prices, arguing that the exchanges were not 
waging a moral crusade but were seeking to establish a monopoly.119  
Following the Wall Street Crash of 1929, and propelled by a wave of hostile public sentiment 
towards the banks, three separate pieces of legislation were passed by the US Congress to 
prevent what was seen to be undesirable interference in commodity markets by speculators, 
namely, the Securities Act of 1933, 120  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 121  and the 
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA).122  The most significant of these was the CEA, which, 
among other things, banned all commodity options trading.123 Options, which grant the right but 
not the obligation to buy or sell a commodity, were deemed to be highly speculative and were 
seen to pose a risk to grain price stability. The option ban remained in effect until 1981, when the 
CFTC reintroduced the trading of exchange-traded options on futures contracts as part of a three-
                                                          
112 ‘History’, CFTC, available at: http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_precftc. 
113 Cowing, supra n 82 at 28-29. 
114 Hochfelder, ‘How Bucket Shops Lured the Masses into the Market’ 1 October 2013, available at: 
www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-01-10/how-bucket-shops-lured-the-masses-into-the-market.  
115 Ibid.  
116 Stout, ‘Why the law hates speculators: regulation and private ordering in the market for OTC derivatives’ (1999) 
48 Duke Law Journal 701 at 719. 
117 Stout, ‘Uncertainty, dangerous optimism, and speculation: An inquiry into some limits of democratic 
governance’ (2011) 97 Cornell Law Review 1177 at 1205. 
118 Hochfelder, ‘Where the Common People Could Speculate”: The Ticker, Bucket Shops, and the Origins of Popular 
Participation in Financial Markets, 1880–1920’ (2006) 93 Journal of American History 2 at 351. 
119 Ibid. 
120 15 USC. 77a-77aa. 
121 15 USC 78a-78jj 
122 P.L. 74-765, 49 Stat. 149. 
123 Sections 4c(b) and 4c(c) of the CEA 1936. 
20 
 
year pilot programme. 124  The CEA further created the Commodity Exchange Authority—a 
regulatory body that had the power to set ‘position limits’ restricting the size of speculative 
positions by individual traders or those acting in concert with each other. 
Although the trade in commodity futures contracts continued to boom during the early 
twentieth century, this was interrupted by the advent of World War Two. On account of 
government intervention schemes, such as those administered in the US under the Commodity 
Credit Corporation, the pricing function of futures remained suspended in the decades after the 
war.125 It wasn’t until the 1970s that the trade in commodity futures was resurrected, as a result 
of the liberalization policies that fundamentally restructured global economic relations.     
D. Liberalization 
It is well known that a wave of liberalization and deregulation swept the world in the 1970s 
and 1980s, at the behest of a new political allegiance intent on giving effect to the free market 
philosophies of economists such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman.126 The watershed 
moment was the decision to abandon the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the 
early 1970s. Under Bretton Woods, all international currencies had been pegged to the US Dollar, 
and, at this time, the flow of capital across international borders was tightly controlled.127 A new 
system of floating exchange rates was devised when US economic interests became 
compromised by these arrangements, leading it to affect a unilateral withdrawal in 1971. 128 
Following this withdrawal, restrictions on the free movement of capital were lifted. Free market 
economists like Hayek and Friedmann, whose views were given institutional backing by the 
multilateral financial institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank, persuaded many 
countries to abandon restrictions on the freedom of capital to move across borders. With the 
advent of this increased market liberalization, producers, manufacturers and retailers were forced 
to compete in an increasingly globalized world economy. Their incomes became newly 
vulnerable to fluctuations in global interest and exchange rates. A new breed of financial 
derivatives was developed by the financial services industry, ostensibly to assist in insuring 
against these market movements.  
It is commonly suggested that derivatives were a timely development on the part of the 
financial services industry to respond to the challenges of a liberalized global economy. Yet, 
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closer scrutiny of the development of derivatives upsets the assumption that their invention was a 
matter of economic necessity. Innovations that led to the development of a new class of 
financialized derivatives out of the basic structure of the futures contract took place in the 
‘Euromarkets’—established in the 1950s and 1960s as a means of evading international 
restrictions on the free movement of capital.129 According to Tickell, it was in this arena of 
regulatory exception—thus called because the UK and US governments actively encouraged the 
development of this ‘offshore’ market—that international banking began to ‘develop its own 
dynamic’, leading to the innovation of a new science of financial risk management that brought 
in an era of models, formulas, and sophisticated financial products, such as derivatives. 130  
The trading of ‘eurobonds’—a precursor of derivatives that enabled bonds to be denominated 
in a currency other than the home currency of the country in which the bond is issued—helped to 
undermine the operation of capital controls and destabilized the Bretton Woods system. 131 
Moreover, as a paper by one of the pioneers of derivatives, Leo Melamed, makes clear the 
development of derivatives actually predates the decision to abandon the gold standard.132 Rather 
than being a solution to the exigencies of a newly liberalized global economy, the development 
of derivatives as a tool of private risk management helped to justify the US decision to move 
away from Bretton Woods.133 Derivatives are not strictly a matter of economic necessity; they 
are also policy choice. What is more, while derivatives do offer protection from risks extending 
from liberalized global markets, they can also contribute to price instability by facilitating 
destabilizing flows of financial capital. 134  As well as legitimizing the growth of derivatives 
markets, the shift in the policy agenda towards more liberalized global markets also brought 
about a shift in public perceptions about the social utility of speculation.135 Businesses seeking to 
ensure that the value of their goods would not be negatively affected by fluctuating exchange 
rates might not always find another commercial party to enter into a hedging transaction with. 
Speculators, who would take up the other side of these transactions, thus came to be seen as 
playing a legitimate economic function by assisting commercial hedgers, no matter if their 
motives were speculative or not. 
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME)—formerly the Chicago Butter and Egg Board—
introduced the first currency futures contracts in 1972. This made it possible to exploit price 
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fluctuations between the British Pound, Canadian Dollar, Deutsche Mark, French Franc, 
Japanese Yen, and Mexican Peso.136 Currencies began to be bought and sold on a market that 
would soon dwarf the markets for all other asset classes put together.137 By this point, futures 
trading had taken on a very different character from the traditional open outcry trading first 
established in Chicago. Previously dominated by traders in company-designed suits, 
communicating through elaborate hand signals, these traditions were gradually replaced by 
screens, mobile phones, and television channels.138 Along with the advent of electronic trading, a 
new trade in OTC instruments or ‘swaps’, as they are called in the US, began to emerge. 
E. Deregulation 
At first, Stout writes, OTC swaps traders may not have realized that the instruments that they 
were trading might be deemed legally void as speculative ‘difference contracts’.139 By the 1980s, 
however, they were well aware of the problem. Seeking to protect their new industry, financial 
firms mounted an ‘orchestrated campaign’ to give legal certainty to the trade in currency and 
interest rate swaps—the most commonly traded financial derivatives at the time.140 A number of 
scholars and journalists, including Stout, Carruthers,141 and Tett,142 have chronicled the decade-
long tussle between the financial services industry and state regulatory agencies over the legal 
status of OTC contracts. Each of these authors reinforces that doubts about the safety of the 
proposals were raised at congressional hearings. However, pressure from powerful financial 
lobbyists began to build.143 As a result of the increasingly liberalized economic climate, it was 
argued that OTC derivatives were necessary to hedge against new forms of risk threatening 
commercial enterprise. What is more, risk was now something that could be calculated with 
accuracy, thanks to the new calculative powers of financial science, or so it was argued.144 By 
the late 1990s, resistance to the clamour for deregulation collapsed, and the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act (CFMA) was passed. Stout is the most explicit in her argument about the role 
that law played in the emergence of the OTC market. She concludes that the global financial 
crisis was ‘the direct and foreseeable … consequence of the CFMA's sudden and wholesale 
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removal of centuries-old legal constraints on speculative trading in over-the-counter 
derivatives’.145  
The expansion of the OTC market place was incontestably a consequence of legislative acts 
of deregulation. The Financial Services Act (FSA) 1986 in the UK and the CFMA 2000 in the 
US dismantled statutory and Common law rules put into place expressly to prevent the 
speculative trade in ‘off-exchange’ futures instruments.146 As well as legitimating a market in 
OTC derivative instruments, a provision in the CFMA known as the ‘swap-dealer’ loophole 
benefited financial institutions selling OTC derivatives by treating them as commercial hedgers 
for the purposes of investing in exchange-traded futures contracts. This critical re-
characterization allowed financial institutions dealing in swaps to take long‐term positions in 
commodity futures markets—a change in trading practice that paved the way for the 
development of index funds.147 On the other hand, while Stout is correct to insist that changes in 
the law were instrumental in bringing about growth of the OTC derivatives market, it is 
inaccurate to suggest that all of the changes amounted to ‘deregulation’. Derivatives instruments 
themselves are creatures of law—contracts; bundles of legal rights and obligations; synthetic 
legal constructions—that have no independent existence outside of their contractual form.148 
While they are categorized as private law instruments, they are nonetheless dependent on 
domestic public legal institutions—national courts—for vindication.149 Nor did the claim of the 
financial services industry to be able to self-regulate through these risk management instruments 
inspire a complete withdrawal of centralized regulatory supervision. Market-based measures of 
value and risk were ‘hard-wired’ into regulatory policies to replace standardized regulatory 
requirements in financial governance.150 A more compelling analysis is that financial regulations 
were not so much removed but rather recalibrated during the 1990s and 2000s. Derivatives, after 
all, can be understood as a form of regulation in themselves. These instruments are not only a 
private legal mechanism used by private actors to manage individual risks. Rather, governments 
have positioned derivatives as an alternative to domestic or international mechanisms to deal 
with the destabilizing effect of flows of trade and investment, thereby delegating a form of 
regulatory power over the health of the broader economy to the private sector. 
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F. Financialization 
Though the CFMA opened the gates, other developments during the 1990s established food 
commodities as the ‘next generation asset-class’, 151  a term coined in 2004 by Jim Rogers, 
bestselling author of Adventure Capitalist152 and Hot Commodities.153 It was partly as a result of 
the collapse of the property bubble and the frantic search for investment opportunities after the 
global financial crisis that commodity futures markets were cast in the role that the dot.com and 
real estate markets had played before them—as an attractive haven for financial capital. 
Investment banks such as Goldman Sachs began to tout commodity investment as a ‘portfolio 
enhancer’ that would enable investors to ‘diversify’ their investment portfolios and protect their 
assets in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 155 From the humble forward contracts of the 
nineteenth century, commodity futures evolved into an established asset class in the market for 
global capital. This critical transition is no better illustrated than by the merger of the CBOT with 
the several key financial and stock trading institutions in 2007. The exchange was bought by the 
CME Group—a corporation that now owns not only the CBOT, but also the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME), as well as a majority share in the Dow Jones Indexes (one of the major stock 
market indexes).156 Its range of derivatives includes futures and options based on interest rates, 
equity indexes, foreign exchange, energy, agricultural commodities, weather and real estate.157 
Food and financial futures are now traded under the auspices of a single multinational trading 
corporation, indistinguishable in their form and purpose to the traders who move vast sums of 
money between stocks, currencies, and grain commodities and back again with the click of a 
mouse. While it is still possible to purchase a traditional futures contract for 5,000 bushels of 
Soft Red Winter Wheat,158 many individual contracts are now bundled together and traded as 
part of a commodity index fund. Millions of trades are now executed by computer programmes 
that use financial algorithms to exploit ‘infinitesimal price discrepancies that only exist over the 
most infinitesimal time horizons’.159  
Zooming out from Chicago, the bigger picture is one of a global economy dramatically 
altered over the course of the past century. The US economy and, even more so, the UK 
economy is now heavily dependent for revenue on financial services.160 Alongside their roles in 
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the generation of financial revenue and the provision of risk management, commodity derivative 
markets are now widely positioned as the optimum mechanism for the gathering of information 
on supply and demand fundamentals in the underlying economy. No longer do futures exchanges 
jealously guard their prices, as they did in the bucket-shop era. Instead, they actively publish and 
disseminate them, extolling their virtue for the purposes of ‘price discovery’. As Charles Carey, 
the Chairman of the CBOT confirmed in 2007, ‘[t]he whole world sees our prices, and the whole 
world reacts to our prices’.161 There are applications for mobile phones that are marketed to 
farmers and grain commodity sellers to allow them to check futures prices for precisely this 
purpose.162  
G. Implications 
No one would claim that the financialization of commodity futures markets was the only 
factor that led to the price spikes in 2007-8 and 2010-11. Factors such as new weather patterns 
resulting from climate change, wars and strikes impacting on the production of oil—a widely-
relied upon agricultural input—and the widespread promotion of biofuels that have led to tonnes 
of grain being diverted away from human consumption all contributed to these market events. 
Isolating the precise role played by increased investment in commodity derivatives has proven 
exceptionally challenging. This is why an engagement with the history of commodity futures 
trading is so valuable. When it comes to financial markets, bankers and economists are the 
‘experts’, which makes their denials about the causal significance of speculation hard to 
contest—even if economic tools of analysis have not provided a convincing alternative 
explanation for the magnitude of the price volatility post-2007. These contingents would likely 
dismiss evidence of linkages between speculation in futures trading and grain price volatility in 
the past as ‘circumstantial’. This has certainly been the treatment of the various forms of 
evidence marshalled by the NGOs, which clearly indicate a connection between commodity 
derivatives speculation and the grain price volatility of 2007-11. I would argue that precisely 
what the history of commodity futures serves to provide is a sense of the critical importance of 
the ‘circumstantial’. Changes in circumstance prompt changes in human behaviour, as the 
introduction of standardized futures, the modes of private ordering developed at the CBOT, the 
publication of futures prices to the ‘common’ people, and the development of instruments that 
have permitted capital to flow across borders would all exemplify. The theories and models that 
have been used by economists to deny that activity in commodity derivative markets could have 
had the impact suggested by the NGOs are all based on assumptions about how people behave in 
markets. Once one gets a sense of the considerable qualitative differences between the early 
trading of futures contracts as a means of agricultural insurance, and the way that commodity 
derivatives are bought and sold in contemporary markets this begs the question whether 
economic tools are sufficiently sophisticated to account for how behaviours in the market are 
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likely to have changed as a result of these altered circumstances. I will now seek to demonstrate 
how processes of finanicalization have opened up new channels of influence whereby activity in 
commodity derivative markets can impact on underlying commodity prices. 
 First, the ‘financialization’ of commodity futures markets has exponentially increased the 
opportunities for a wide range of parties to trade in instruments linked to commodity prices. 
Some have suggested that the sheer volume of investment in commodity derivatives alone has 
created a form of ‘artificial demand’ for underlying commodities, pushing prices up.163 However, 
a more persuasive explanation is that the financialization of futures trading has changed the 
nature of speculation itself. As De Schutter underlines, ‘traditional’ speculation carried out in the 
early days of the CBOT was still speculation based on information agricultural fundamentals—a 
link to agriculture was maintained.164 By contrast, speculation in contemporary futures markets 
has become predominantly ‘momentum based’. In synergy with trading in other financial 
markets, actors trading commodity derivatives increasingly engage in ‘herding’ behaviour—
watching the markets and anticipating how other actors are going to invest.165 As John Maynard 
Keynes and Hyman Minsky both argued, it can become irrational for traders to persist in trying 
to trade on accurate information on supply and demand when so-called ‘technical’ or ‘noise’ 
traders are driving prices upwards of fundamentals. 166  Commodity index funds are another 
structural development that means that trading positions no longer reflect supply and demand 
fundamentals for agricultural commodities. Index investors automatically roll their expiring 
contracts over into new ‘long’ positions,167 meaning that vast sums of money are funneled into 
indexes by large institutional investors irrespective of the day-to-day movements of each 
individual commodity.168 Index fund investment is further exacerbated by increased reliance on 
financial algorithms. Just as the stock-ticker facilitated the diffusion of commodity futures prices 
in the 1920s, thereby affecting market behaviour, the electronic trading software, options-pricing 
formulas, and high-frequency trading technologies developed to facilitate the trade in OTC 
derivatives have changed trading behaviours. More than 95 per cent of futures are bought and 
sold today through computer networks, many of which operate to exploit a twitch in market 
movement or value irrespective of what informed it.169  
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Financial investment in commodity derivative instruments has not been a steady upward 
trend, and levels of investment did drop in 2009.170 Nevertheless, financial investors continue to 
invest large volumes of capital in financial instruments linked to food prices. The Standard and 
Poor GSCI Agricultural Index gained two-thirds from 2010, reaching a record level in March 
2011, when the second commodity price spike emerged in international markets for grain.171 
What is more, as a report by Oxfam underlined in 2011, ‘the expansion of commodity 
speculation has not reached its end’.172 Quite to the contrary, Oxfam’s analysts argue, several 
financial institutions are only just beginning to deepen their involvement in commodity 
derivatives. Bayern LB announced at the end of 2011 that they had established a two per cent 
position in financial instruments linked to agricultural prices, and the DZ bank created its own 
commodity index, the DZ Bank Best Commodity, in 2011, in which wheat and corn each 
account for twelve and a half percent.173 Contemporary futures trading continues to be dominated 
by actors who have no interest in agricultural fundamentals, and who buy and sell exchange 
traded commodity futures and OTC commodity derivatives as though they were any other 
financial asset. As a result of the financialization of the market, far fewer market participants are 
basing their trading decisions on research into supply and demand for agricultural commodities.  
The introduction of new financial means and motives provides a clear indication of how the 
prices of commodity derivatives can be driven into a speculative bubble. Nevertheless, this does 
not provide a complete explanation for how activity in commodity derivative markets can impact 
on underlying commodity prices. To understand this, it is necessary to emphasize the 
repositioning of derivatives markets as playing two critically important roles in the liberalized 
global economy. Since the 1980s, derivative markets have been positioned as simultaneously the 
venues in which risk management tools are bought and sold, and a sophisticated information-
gathering mechanism that leads to ‘price discovery’. Futures prices are meant to reflect 
information more complete than would be available on fragmented ‘spot’ markets (markets for 
tangible food commodities).174 Going back to the critiques of Krugman, while he may be correct 
that a bet about a futures price has no direct effect on a spot price, it has a very well-established 
indirect effect. Taking a position in a futures market is a miniscule contribution—a claim to 
information—that goes towards the formation of a futures price that is used as a benchmark to 
set the underlying spot price. Technologies have been developed that assist farmers and grain 
sellers in checking futures prices for precisely this purpose. Taken together, the contemporary 
trade in financialized commodity derivatives enables a spectrum of different actors to take 
positions in the market for commodity futures that are not based on information about supply and 
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demand fundamentals, but that are being read as such by other market actors. This indicates a 
clear channel of influence between speculative-inflated prices listed on financialized commodity 
futures markets and the prices of physical food commodities that is not adequately accounted for 
in the accounts of economists who continue posit these markets as separate.  
On this last matter, it is necessary to address a final outstanding issue. Due to the influence of 
behavioural economics, few economists are likely to contest the point that futures prices can be 
inflated by collective speculative ambitions.175 Similarly, most economists, Krugman included, 
will be aware that practices of benchmarking can mean that futures prices can influence prices in 
underlying markets, even if this practice is not frequently foregrounded in their analyses. The 
crux of the debate over the role of commodity derivatives speculation in the price volatility 
hinges, therefore, on the insistence by economists that rational arbitrageurs can be depended 
upon to intervene in speculatively-distorted futures markets and to restore prices to their 
‘fundamental’ values. In this context, arbitrage would involve purchasing and storing physical 
grain and selling commodity futures and derivatives to drive futures prices back down. Krugman 
has used data on commodity storage to argue that no accumulation of the kind that would be 
produced by arbitrageurs was observed during the price spikes—a fact that he claims indicates 
that speculation was not causally significant.176 Campaigners have already countered Krugman’s 
claims by pointing to the proliferation of private grain storage facilities that is not accounted for 
in his data set.177 This would suggest that arbitrageurs could in fact have been exploiting a price 
divergence between ‘artificially’ inflated futures and ‘fundamental’ values during this period. I 
would now like to return to the history of commodity futures trading to supplement their 
objections with a broader point.  
Much in the way that the standardization of forwards contracts incentivized a spate of 
speculation in the nineteenth century, the financialization of futures trading has created novel 
incentives for market actors. The publication of futures prices in the 1920s prompted huge 
swathes of ordinary people to begin speculating via bucket-shops. Similarly, since the late 1980s, 
actors like pension funds and commercial grain traders expanded their range of market activities 
and have adopted novel strategies to speculate on price movements. Arbitrageurs are now also 
availed of an array of instruments that allow them to exploit price differences without having to 
pay for grain storage. Much of economic theory explains behaviour in markets as a function of 
self-interested, profit-maxismising behaviour. My question is why arbitrageurs are assumed to be 
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immune to the profitable opportunities that the financialization of futures trading extends to them? 
Why would a rational arbitrageur burst a price bubble by attempting to restore prices to 
fundamentals by handling grain when more profit can be made—and more efficiently too—by 
trading with the herd? Is it not possible—likely, even—that the proliferation of financial 
instruments linked to the price of commodities and the opportunities that they extend has 
changed what it is rational to do in this market, including for arbitrageurs?  
This section has sought to illustrate how changes in the character of commodity futures 
trading has opened up new channels of influence whereby the trading of commodity derivatives 
can impact on underlying food prices. As well as testifying to how altered circumstances change 
market behaviour, the analysis has sought to relate something of the enabling role that State and 
legal institutions have played in facilitating the transformation of a mechanism for agricultural 
insurance into a financial asset. Commodity futures contracts were developed as a means to 
facilitate farmers, and other actors involved in food processing and retailing, in the production of 
food for human consumption. In spite of clear historical evidence of linkages between surges in 
speculation, grain price volatility and the trading of futures contracts outside of regulated 
exchanges, since the late 1980s, governments have been doing precisely what Common Law 
courts refused to do. They have created the legal and institutional support for the development of 
a market in instruments that enable a wide range of actors to speculate on the price of food. 
While they may be traded by professional financiers, valued according to complex mathematical 
formulae, and enjoy legal certainty and the backing of national courts, as bilateral bespoke 
instruments that facilitate speculative wagers, OTC commodity derivatives closely resemble 
speculative contracts for difference. What is more, the activities of speculators have been 
legitimated by a discourse that positions them as providing a public service by assisting in the 
mitigation of risk. The liberalization of markets for trade and capital was only possible thanks to 
the prior development of derivatives to protect commercial revenue from the risks associated 
with exposure to global markets. And, yet, the very real—if frequently under-interrogated—
existence of risks relating to exchange rate fluctuations, interest rate appreciations, and 
destabilizing capital flows justifies both financial and commercial actors in entering into yet 
more derivatives transactions in order to hedge against such risks. To the extent that many such 
hedging transactions are, like speculative transactions, likely to be divorced from the 
fundamentals of agricultural supply and demand, they may pose a similar threat to food price 
stability. This has important implications for the new regulations developed in response to the 
campaigns of NGOs. The primary concern of this article, though, is to consider how a 
financialized trade in commodity derivatives may impact on efforts to realise the right to 
adequate food.  
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5. COMMODITY DERIVATIVES TRADING AND THE RIGHT TO 
ADEQUATE FOOD 
 
The right to adequate food imposes three levels of obligation on State parties: the 
obligation to respect, to protect and to fulfil the right, with the obligation to fulfil encompassing 
both an obligation to facilitate access to food and to provide it in certain circumstances.178 As the 
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has made clear, the duties of 
State signatories extend not only to ensuring the availability of food adequate to the need of their 
populations, but also the accessibility of that food, including the ability of citizens to access it 
economically. 179  Economic accessibility implies that ‘personal or household financial costs 
associated with the acquisition of food for an adequate diet should be at a level such that the 
attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised’. 180 
Discussing the responsibilities of States in a context of high and volatile food prices, Olivier de 
Schutter has underlined that ‘[s]ecuring the right to food means ensuring that people have access 
to adequate food at affordable prices, whatever the market conditions.’181 As studies detailing the 
impact of the global food crisis would attest, however, ‘[m]ost poor households were left to cope 
on their own with high price rises’.182 Very few of those surveyed in early to mid 2008 reported 
having received any assistance from the State.183 What is more, many people in low-income 
countries in the Global South were forced to switch to less nutritious foods to afford bread and 
rice during the crisis, and to spend less on other essential needs such as clean water, sanitation, 
education and health care.184 On this basis alone many States could be found to have been in 
breach of their obligations to ensure economic accessibility to food during the global food crisis.  
 
While this may be true, placing responsibility on the resource-stretched governments of the 
countries in which populations suffered most acutely from the effects of the price inflation may 
not be the most fruitful, or the most just, strategy to protect the right to adequate food. Attention 
might be better directed to those States whose policies have both exacerbated conditions of food 
insecurity and have enabled a profitable trade in financial instruments linked to the prices of 
staple food commodities. As the scholarship discussed in Part Two has shown, policy choices 
that favoured an industrialized, specialized, export-oriented mode of agricultural production, and 
that liberalized markets for trade and for financial capital, have increased reliance on global 
markets for basic food staples. As this article has now demonstrated, governments in the US, the 
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UK, Europe, and in other parts of the world with a developed financial sector have supported the 
transformation of commodity futures markets into arenas for profitable financial speculation and 
hedging. New channels of influence have been opened whereby both the risk-management and 
profit-making needs of commercial and financial enterprises can impact on the critical measure 
of value that determines access to food for increasingly market-dependent populations around the 
world.  
 
As well as being under a duty to progressively realize the right to adequate food, States must 
also ensure that other enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals of their access to 
food.185 In General Comment 12, CESCR has specifically identified the failure of a State to 
regulate the activities of individuals or groups so as to prevent them from violating the right to 
food of others as grounds for a violation of the right.186 As the history of futures trading makes 
clear, the growth of an industry in which the needs of food insecure populations have been 
subordinated to the interests of financial profit is the result of the conscious decision of 
governments to ‘deregulate’ commodity futures trading (in the sense of removing it from 
regulatory supervision) since the late 1980s. The success of the trade in commodity derivatives 
has further depended on the active support for the functioning of derivative markets, and the 
enforcement of a range of new derivatives contracts in national courts. Governments in the US 
and in Europe have thus permitted the development of a complex array of instruments that have 
enabled financial actors to treat food commodities as they would any other financial asset. In 
response to the suggestion that governments are responsible for speculatively-conditioned food 
price volatility, it might be countered that it could not have been known an advance that activity 
in commodity derivative markets could lead to such harmful patterns of price volatility. Again, 
however, the history of commodity futures markets illustrates that these events were indeed 
foreseeable. Courts in the primary jurisdictions in which commodity derivatives are now traded 
once refused to enforce speculative contracts for difference because of concerns about the social 
implications of such trading practices. Legislation was carefully elaborated in the US in the 
1930s with the aim of restricting volumes of speculative trading in commodity futures based on 
concerns about market manipulation and grain price volatility. Surely it is these States, then, and 
not the governments of countries most affected by the events of the global food crisis, should be 
the ones that are called to account? 
 
As Smita Narula has argued, there are issues in attempts to hold States responsible for the 
actions of third party actors in the transnational context. In her view, the effective 
implementation of the right to food is ‘undermined by international human rights law’s state-
centric focus and jurisdictional constraints’. 187  She is persuasive in her argument that 
globalization has meant that the activities of a company or a financial institution domiciled in 
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one country can now impact on the food security of citizens of another State, creating an 
accountability gap. Obligations under human rights treaties charge States with responsibility 
towards their own citizens, not those of other States. A similar assessment would seem 
applicable to the present matter of commodity price volatility, which is typically portrayed as 
having being exacerbated by speculators operating in global markets either beyond the law or, at 
least, domiciled in a different country to those who suffered most in 2007-11.  Bearing in mind 
the information that this article has brought to light, however, assigning responsibility for 
activities in global markets might not be as difficult as is commonly thought. The globalization 
and the liberalization of markets now means that the actions of institutions reverberate around an 
increasingly interconnected economy. This means that citizens of all States are affected by the 
permissions that are granted to financial and corporate entities operating in these market, 
including those in which international financial institutions are domiciled. Citizens in the US, the 
UK, and Europe were also impacted by the price volatility in 2007-11, albeit to a lesser extent.188 
This could provide a basis to breach the accountability gap Narula identifies. A more preferable 
route, however, might be to work towards acceptance that the responsibilities of States under 
international human rights law extend to the actions of commercial and financial actors that 
relate to international markets on the basis that they can impact on the human rights of all 
mankind.  
 
In his role as Special Rapporteur, De Schutter has done much to bring the issue of 
commodity derivatives speculation to the attention of the international community. De Schutter 
clearly places responsibility on those States in whose jurisdictions commodity derivatives are 
traded to take steps to prevent infringements of the right to adequate food, even if the negative 
effects of these activities are predominantly felt by persons living in other jurisdictions. He has 
outlined a number of steps that States can take to ensure economic access to food going forward, 
including the establishment of grain reserves, actions to protect access to land, and, importantly, 
the regulation of commodity derivatives trading.189 ‘States should ensure that dealing with food 
commodity derivatives is restricted as far as possible’, he suggests, ‘to qualified and 
knowledgeable investors who deal with such instruments on the basis of expectations regarding 
market fundamentals, rather than mainly or only by speculative motives.’ These measures, he 
maintains, ‘would enable States to fulfil their legal obligations arising under the human right to 
food.’190 The difficult with this prescription is that, as discussed in Part Three, regulating to 
restrict excessive levels of speculation in the market has been fraught with complication. De 
Schutter gives no indication as to how the subjective motives of traders are to be determined 
when they are effecting transactions in the market—something that has proven to be an issue in 
the attempt to create regulatory rules in the US and in Europe. The ambition to apply a scheme of 
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regulatory rules that preserves the benefits of the market but removes the worst ‘excesses’ has an 
obvious appeal. On the other hand, as this article has sought to emphasise, it is the broader 
industry of financialized commodity derivatives trading that puts food prices in jeopardy. It is 
not clear if this industry can be regulated in a way that removes the potential threat posed to food 
prices whilst ensuring that derivatives can still be used to play a vital function in risk 
management.  
 
This article does not offer a concrete recommendation as to how the challenges of 
commodity derivatives trading and their potential to contribute to future patterns of food price 
volatility can be resolved. For now, it puts forth only a plea—a plea for a fundamental shift in 
perceptions about the nature of State responsibility in the context of world hunger. Both the 
conditions that enabled activity in commodity derivatives to exacerbate the price volatility in 
2007-11 and the vulnerability of food insecure populations are, to a significant extent, the 
consequences of a stance taken by States towards markets—financial and commercial. Broader 
policies that States adopt towards markets in general, and not just specific policies in the area of 
agriculture, must be assessed for their potential impact on the ability of populations to command 
access to food. Finally, while there is much to be commended about the initiatives being 
proposed by the High Level Task Force to improve food security, these efforts repeat a mistake 
common to many of the earlier (failed) attempts to tackle world hunger. This is a tendency to 
focus on the lack of entitlement of the poor and vulnerable, whilst leaving the entitlements of 
more powerful market actors largely naturalized and under-interrogated. If the contribution of 
commodity derivatives trading to the 2007-11 global food crisis can tell us anything, it is that 
more attention must be paid to how the entitlements of more powerful market actors are being 
exercised and extended, and how this impacts on access to food. After all, what the diverse range 
of actors trading commodity derivatives in the years leading up to the crisis had in common was 
that they were trading these contracts in a legally-constructed, State-sanctioned market, secure in 
the confidence that their entitlements would be respected, protected, and fulfilled.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Speculative investment in commodity derivatives was not the sole factor to cause the global 
food crisis. A constellation of supply and demand factors are implicated in the causation of the 
price spikes, and quantifying the precise contribution made by speculative activity may not be 
possible. This article has drawn on the history of commodity futures trading to counter 
influential denials issued by economists and the financial services industry that are jeopardizing 
current efforts to regulate excessive levels of speculation in commodity derivative markets. An 
examination of the history of futures trading provides a clear illustration of how commodity 
futures markets have been financialized in recent decades, creating new channels whereby 
activity in derivative markets can have an impact on underlying food prices. This is highly 
significant for the ability of future generations to enjoy food security. Importantly, this history 
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also demonstrates that the capacity of States to control and shape the nature of operations of 
global financial markets is more extensive than is commonly believed. This has significant 
implications for the responsibilities of States and their obligations with regards to the right to 
adequate food. The broader scheme of policies adopted by States towards markets has to be 
understood to influence the ability of the food insecure to command access food. What is more, 
rather than continuing to focus on the ‘lack’ of entitlement of the food ‘insecure’, greater 
attention must be paid to the origins, form, and significance of the abundance of entitlement 
enjoyed by other market actors, whose position in global markets has perhaps become too secure. 
To quote a trader from the CBOT, in modern market structures ‘what for a poor man is a crust, 
for a rich man is a securitized asset class.’191 The notion that global commodity markets can do 
justice to both sets of ‘needs’ is a fiction, one that must be challenged if the right to adequate 
food is to become more than an aspiration.192  
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